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Abstract: A viatical settlement (or viatical) is a transaction in which an investor purchases the life insurance policy from a terminally ill person for a lump sum so that
the investor can receive those benefits at the time of death. While there is an ongoing
debate in the insurance and financial planning industry about viaticals, including the
ethics of this practice, the focus has been predominantly on abuses (i.e., the practice
of buying and selling viaticals) and less on the fundamental ethicality of the economic
idea behind viaticals. This paper offers a systematic ethical analysis of viaticals that
leverages the distinction between the ethicality of an economic idea and the ethicality of economic reality to isolate and discuss the fundamental ethical problems of
viaticals. By unpacking the evaluative content of our negative emotional reactions to
viaticals, we show that, even under ideal circumstances, the economic idea of viaticals
is, at its core, unethical.
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Introduction
A viatical settlement (or viatical) is a transaction in which an investor purchases
the life insurance policy from a terminally ill person for a lump sum so that the
investor can receive those benefits at the time of death. Viatical transactions have
provoked a variety of responses. On the one hand, Quinn,1 in her important study,
describes the changing moral perceptions in the viatical market, and reveals that
many of those perceptions point to the inherent immorality associated with benefiting economically from the suffering of others. Trinkhaus and Giacalone2 also
speak of “entrepreneurial ‘mining’ of the dying” and highlight several ethical issues that might arise in the economic transactions surrounding the final stages of
life. On the other hand, the moral perceptions of many participating in this industry are more positive and focus on the benefits to the dying or changing attitudes
toward death among the public.3
The development of the viatical industry has been quite rapid and the forecasts indicate that viaticals are becoming less of a fringe product. As of 2002,
there were already forty-five viatical settlement companies purchasing policies.4
Sanford C. Bernstein & Company estimated that in 2005 the market for “used”
policies topped $13 billion and could hit $160 billion by 2030.5 Despite the increased use of viaticals and the ongoing debate in the insurance and financial
planning industry about such transactions, most articles that discuss the ethical
concerns surrounding viaticals are mainly concerned about the potential, and on
occasion documented, abuses that occur in connection with viaticals rather than on
the fundamental ethicality of viaticals themselves.6
This focus on what can be called the ethicality of economic reality is intriguing because it implicitly assumes that the ethical concerns associated with viaticals
can be overcome if those aspects of viaticals that have caused or can cause harm
are improved (for example by regulation, improvements in the marketplace, more
education of insurance professionals, etc.). However, a few researchers have explicitly called attention to problems associated with the ethicality of the economic
idea behind viaticals.7 Duska for example points out that the negative reactions that
individuals have toward such products might be because “life insurance policies
owned by strangers, and in some cases speculators, are fundamentally in conflict
with the very nature and primary purpose of a life insurance policy [which is] a
purely altruistic product.”8 He goes on to point out that while viaticals and other insurance schemes might be innovative financial tools, they might also contribute to
a commodification of an individual’s life and thus might not be socially desirable.9
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Another interesting characteristic of the debate surrounding viaticals, which
Duska10 also points to is the tension between the negative moral responses by
those unfamiliar with the industry (such as the general public) and the positive
moral evaluations by industry insiders.11 From this, it seems as if the negative
responses of the public and the ethical evaluations of the industry are not in
alignment. This misalignment could be explained in terms of cognitive biases on
both sides. On the one hand, the negative reactions of the general public might be
due to the frequent reporting of abuses (availability bias). On the other hand, the
positive evaluations by industry insiders might be a psychological mechanism to
reduce discomfort from working in an industry that is perceived to be unsavory.12
Even though cognitive biases probably do play an important role here, we believe that this misalignment in ethical evaluation has more to do with conflating
concerns regarding the practice of viaticals and concerns regarding the viatical
idea itself.
Given these interesting characteristics of the viaticals debate, this paper will
offer a systematic ethical analysis of viaticals that leverages the distinction between
the ethicality of an economic idea and the ethicality of its reality (or practice) to
isolate and discuss the fundamental ethical problems of viaticals. We believe that
in order to determine whether an economic practice or product is ethical, there
are essentially two questions that need to be answered. The first is whether under
ideal circumstances the product or practice is or can be used ethically. The second
is whether it is possible that one can achieve that ideal circumstance in practice.
With few exceptions, discussions on the ethicality of viaticals usually focus on
the second question and either do not see or ignore the first question. That is, they
focus on the problems of the implementation and practice of viaticals rather than
the moral nature of the practice itself. However, we believe that the first question has priority, and if it is answered in the negative, then, naturally, a positive
answer to the second question is not possible. By unpacking the evaluative content
of our negative emotiional reactions to viaticals, we show that, even under ideal
circumstances, the economic idea of viaticals is, at its core, unethical. However,
recognizing that the viaticals industry is a legal and an economic reality that is
growing rapidly, we also explore the second question and attempt to delineate,
and discuss, the practical problems of the industry. We believe that the general
structure of this case study can be used to discuss the ethical viability of other
economic practices as well.
To develop the above argument the paper proceeds as follows. First, we give
a description of viaticals and the regulatory environment. Second, we discuss the
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practical problems that arise in connection with viaticals and whether they can be
remedied. And third, by unpacking the evaluative content of our negative emotional reactions to viaticals, we show that the economic idea itself is unethical.

The Economic and Legal Environment of Viaticals
In a viatical settlement the seller (called a “viator”) sells his or her life insurance
policy to a viatical settlement company (called a “provider”) for a lump sum payment that is a percentage of the policy’s face value.13 The viatical provider then
becomes the beneficiary of the policy, and is responsible for making any ongoing
premium payments. When the viator dies, the viatical provider collects the full
face value of the policy. When one buys a viatical, it represents the purchase of
an insurance policy of a terminally ill person at a discounted price. The viatical
provider can either hold the investment for themselves or they may act as a broker
on behalf of some other investor. Either way, in theory, the ill person gets needed
money to help pay expenses before his death and the investor gets the full face
value of the policy when the person dies.
Viatical settlements are a type of life settlements.14 The main difference
between a viatical and a life settlement is that the former usually involves policyholders with medical conditions that are likely to result in two years or less of
life expectancy, whereas life settlements typically involve people over sixty-five
who are not currently ill. However, the legal foundation for both instruments is
the same. It was the Supreme Court decision of Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149
(1911) which provided the legal basis for viatical and life settlements. Dr. A. H.
Grigsby treated a patient who wished to pay for his surgery by selling his life
insurance policy to Dr. Grigsby. When the doctor tried to collect after the patient’s
death, the executor of the estate issued a legal challenge. Eventually the case was
appealed to the Supreme Court where the fundamental principle was established
that a life insurance policy is private property and therefore can be assigned or
disposed of at will by the owner like any of his other property.15
Despite this very early legal precedent, viaticals really didn’t start to become
common until the 1980s when the AIDS crisis occurred. Many of the early victims
of AIDS were young gay men who did not always have traditional dependents
compared to the more typical policy holder. In addition, several members of this
group were very willing to participate in experimental medical treatments that
frequently were not covered by their traditional healthcare insurance. Therefore,
the ability of viaticals to allow patients to access funds for treatment or living
expenses while still alive increased demand on the patient side. In addition, the
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medical developments that existed at that point in history typically did not result
in major extensions of life expectancy after formal diagnosis. This in turn meant
the investor side had some predictability when forecasting payoff and return on
investment.
Since the start of the AIDS crisis, the public awareness over time of the concept of selling one’s life insurance benefit to a third party increased to the general
public. Eventually, inquires among older individuals who were not terminally ill
started to become much more common. This was especially so for individuals
who held whole life policies and wanted more funds to enjoy retirement. Typically, the negotiated price to collect on a whole-life policy death benefit is something
less than the full death benefit but it is always greater than the existing cash value
of the policy. The buyer pays less than the full death benefit in order to represent
a) a time value of money discount, b) the risk associated with the uncertainty of
the life expectancy of the original policyholder, c) possible assumption of ongoing premium payments and d) the potential for lawsuits by dependents after
the fact.16
Even though viatical settlements are not legally considered securities, they
are nevertheless subject to legal regulation. In the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) Congress officially defined the terms “viatical settlement provider” and “terminally and chronically ill insured’s.” Under this
Act, a viatical settlement provider is defined as any person or entity who regularly engaged in the trade or business of viatical settlements.17 Additionally the
act created an incentive for viatical settlements by granting them preferential tax
treatment in the sense of excluding viaticals from gross income as of January 1,
1996. This was done by treating viatical settlements as equivalent to the proceeds
of a life insurance contract payable by reason of death, which thus excludes it (for
now) from gross income if the contract meets certain IRS compliances.18
In the area of tax law and entitlements, it is possible that the payments from
viatical settlements could affect the viator’s eligibility for benefits because a large
enough cash payment can trigger the loss of disability income. To have viatical
income be excluded in calculating eligibility for benefits, specific criteria must be
met under 26 U.S.C. Section 101. Therefore it is not automatic that all viaticals
receive preferential tax treatment on all cases.19

Ethical Concerns and Arguments Associated with the Practice of Viaticals
Since the emergence of viaticals as a form of life settlement, a variety of ethical
concerns have been raised. Most of these concerns, which we examine in this
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section, relate to the empirical reality of how the buying and selling of viaticals is
conducted. Particularly in the early days of viaticals, the terminally ill were often
taken advantage of and the harms to individuals outweighed the benefits for sellers
as well as buyers. Below we examine the potential benefits and harms/risks to the
viatical parties.
Since the buyer provides the previous policy owner with an amount less than
the full face value of the insurance policy, typically 30–80 percent, the potential
return to the investor can be quite high.20 In addition, the payout of a life insurance policy is many times counted as tax free income just as if it were paid to the
original holder of the policy. On the other hand, a viatical settlement company that
chooses to purchase a viatical as a potential investment faces a number of potential
risks. One risk of both viaticals and life settlements is that with improving medical care, the ill or older person may actually live longer than expected. If the new
owner of the policy has to pay the premiums to keep the policy in force, this would
tie up additional capital and thus reduce the net return on the investment. Another
concern is the possibility that the viator’s heirs may challenge the changes made
to the policy, and thus the payoff is tied up in litigation for some period before
collection. Information asymmetry can also lead to a higher probability of fraud.
For example, the insured person might fake an illness simply to collect cash by
selling the policy. Alternatively, viatical companies might recruit ill but uninsured
individuals and encourage them to obtain policies that could then be cancelled
by the insurance company if the fraud is discovered, thus harming investors who
purchased the viaticals.21
While concerns about viaticals have often focused on possible downsides
to the sellers of the policies there are numerous benefits that sellers can realize.
Most of these benefits stem from the ability to get income now rather than after
one’s death. For instance, a viatical can provide for the relief of monthly premium
expenses. This would be especially important if the viator was in a cash flow bind
that would have caused the missing of premiums and therefore the cancelling of
the policy altogether. Selling the policy now would totally eliminate that risk. A
companion benefit is the ability to receive an immediate infusion of cash that
would allow the viator to deal with financial burdens that are in excess of the
premium payments themselves. Such burdens could include offsetting the loss of
current income caused by being unable to work or paying for treatments that are
not covered by health insurance. In addition, some viators simply benefit from
having the ability to control the use of the insurance money while they are still
alive. By selling the settlement now, the viator guarantees that the funds will be
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used for the intended use and therefore the potential ability of heirs to use the
funds for purposes that are not desired is eliminated. Another benefit of viaticals
comes from the current state of tax law. For the time being, lawsuit and insurance
settlements are generally tax free because they are not considered ordinary income in most circumstances. Therefore the government generally does not tax the
payouts of viaticals because they are merely the rearrangement of a pre-existing,
tax-free cash flow.
However, despite these benefits there are some potential downsides of viaticals for the sellers as well. Initially it would seem that receiving a lump sum, cash
distribution would totally eliminate all financial risk for the seller of the viatical.
However this might not necessarily be true. Various clauses and conditions embedded in the policy as well as some external issues may complicate the situation. For
instance, if the policy was designed not just to insure one person but also the lives
of a spouse or other family member, then these individuals’ coverage is potentially
lost when the policy sold. Similarly, there is also the potential loss of other rights
or benefits, including conversion rights and waivers of premium benefits that may
exist under the current terms of the policy. Another potential risk is that if the level
of sophistication of the advice given to the viator is not sufficient, the amount
of premiums one had paid may exceed the relative size of the cash settlement
received depending upon how the deal is structured. This is especially true given
that the policy cash values or dividends that the insured was originally counting on
for income purposes are now forfeited to the investor.
Even if the above risks do not materialize, there still is the possibility that the
viator may get blindsided by things that are not related to the terms of the policy.
One such risk is that there is the possibility of tax consequences to the viator
depending upon which state regulations apply. Or alternatively, the viator may
find at risk his ability to receive services and benefits such as supplemental social
security income, public assistance, and public medical services such as Medicaid.
A central concern surrounding the realization of the potential benefits of
viaticals, particularly those of the seller, is the ability of the seller to make an
autonomous and informed decision in an environment that is usually characterized
by information asymmetry, a restricted set of choices, and emotional stress.22 On
one hand the buyer of viaticals (or the investor) is more sophisticated and more
knowledgeable than the viator is about the financial and legal aspects of the transaction. On the other hand, the seller has significantly more information concerning
the state of health of the insured because the viator lives with the supposed medical condition on a daily basis.
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Furthermore the viaticals seller is usually faced with death and is in a weakened physical, mental and financial condition and thus might not be in a position
to look for or negotiate for the best available settlement, thus allowing companies
to offer excessively small settlements:
In the absence of standards, it’s hard for viators to know whether they got a
fair deal, though too often they do not. Joseph Belth, editor of Insurance Forum, a consumer-oriented industry newsletter, studied viatical transactions
between 1994 and 1998 arranged by eight companies in Florida. He found
that payment ratios varied from as low as 22 percent of a policy’s death
benefit to as much as 60 percent. Even within the same company, Belth
found, similar policies paid out different proportions. Accelerated Benefits,
an Orlando firm, for example, paid 25 percent, 33 percent, and 40 percent
of death benefits to three HIV patients, each with a life expectancy of 48
months, who owned whole-life policies. The surprisingly wide variation,
explains Jess LaMonda, Accelerated’s president, is due to differences in
premiums, brokers’ fees, and loans against the policies.23

A variation of the above argument is that potential viators do not have the
time or resources to thoroughly research their options and explore the potential
for lost state and federal benefits. This argument is supported by the reasonable
observation that while viatical companies have to compete against each other to
provide a “reasonable” price, they do not have an economic interest to investigate
all possible ramifications from the viewpoint of every single viator. And even if
such an economic rationale could be created, viatical companies may not be able
to do so given privacy laws and the lack of willingness of a viator to share all his
personal information during the negotiating process.
Another concern that arises in connection of viaticals is the potential infringement on a persons’ right to privacy. In order to determine the level of risk involved
in purchasing a policy or an investment based on a pool of policies, there is an
interest on the side of the buyer to find out as much personal information from the
insured about his/her health condition as possible and then track this information
throughout the life of the policy. However, the insured might like such information
to remain private or restricted to a limited group of individuals. Since there might
not be legal provisions for these circumstances in a given state, it is possible that
one’s medical condition will be tracked by investors for the rest of a viator’s life.24
The availability of identifying information might expose the viator to a higher
risk from foul play as well.25 For example, a current viatical sales person had been
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convicted of being a middle man in a murder for hire on a family in exchange for
proceeds from life insurance benefits.26
In summary, an analysis of the common ethical concerns surrounding viaticals indicates that there are significant benefits to the different parties involved
in this practice. However, the positive effects are in tension with concerns about
decision autonomy, privacy and potential negative effects on the interests of the
parties involved. The initial moral intuition about this practice focuses on the
decision autonomy of the viator due to the particularly difficult circumstances
viators are usually in. The sick and weak are considered deserving of a heightened
level of care and protection and violations of this principle of care are morally
problematic. The titles of earlier papers written on the subject of viaticals clearly
show the underlying tension between the special moral considerations that attach
to death and the economic potentials arising from such situations: “rolling the dice
on death,”27 “betting on death,”28 or “making a killing.”29
The main ethical challenge in practice thus becomes to balance the increased
duty of care with the economic interest and benefits viaticals can provide if they
are offered in a way that minimizes the possible harms. In other words, is it feasible to offer viaticals in a way that would meet ethical expectations? This question
is an important one because economic practices are often supported by pointing
out their benefits and reducing ethical concerns about harms to practical problems
that await a solution. Thus moral emotions are seen as an indication of areas that
need improvement rather than an indication that a practice itself might be ethically
untenable overall. The following section will examine in more detail what possible
improvements to the practice of viaticals have been suggested or implemented to
address the ethical challenges mentioned earlier.

Responses to Ethical Challenges of Viatical Practice
There are several possibilities to avoid or limit the harms that both seller and purchaser can experience in the process of a viatical settlement. One possibility is
to increase regulation and oversight through federal and state laws in order to
curb abuses and/or mandate more information disclosure and additional licensure.
Another possibility is to allow the industry to create its own internal regulation
mechanisms through the introduction of more stringent professional responsibility
requirements. Lastly, viatical sellers can be exposed to more information about the
product, implications of various choices and available alternatives, for example
through information campaigns sponsored by non-profit, non-governmental or
government organizations.
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As a general trend, the attempts at the Federal level for additional regulation
have been somewhat limited. One example of this concerns the selling of fractional
interests in a patient’s insurance policy to retail investors called “fractionalizing.”
In such a process the investors may purchase as little as 3 percent of the benefits
of an insurance policy. The purpose for this practice is to increase liquidity and
to spread risk among a number of different investors. The SEC had attempted to
regulate this process and the resulting market, but the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Pardo III denied the Commission jurisdiction.30
At the state level, governments originally had difficulty regulating such
contracts and their secondary markets under traditional buyer-seller laws. Later
regulations in some states were eventually incorporated in the insurance sections
of state codes, thereby giving state insurance commissioners and administrators some authority. These regulations typically would require aspects of full
disclosure, voluntary consent, confidentiality guarantees, and protection from
unfair competition, recording duties, licensing, and minimum discount rates. For
example with regard to minimum benefits the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) developed a regulation that would require a minimum
payment to viators based on life expectancy. Only nine states have so far adopted
this payment scale.31 Other requirements included in the model act proposed by
the NAIC regard licensure (a license would be required to sell viaticals—currently
even real estate agents can sell viaticals in twenty-five states). Other restrictions
relate to advertising; for example terms like “guaranteed” or “safe” cannot be used
(NAIC). However, many states still have not implemented such requirements in
their state regulations.32
While it is questionable whether legal regulation can be successfully implemented, given the questionable jurisdiction of the SEC and the inconsistency of
responses on the state level, another possibility is for the industry to self regulate.
This self-regulation could take the form of increased responsibilities expected
from professionals who deal in viaticals, similar to codes of conduct in the real
estate industry33 or the code of conduct of the certified financial planners board of
standards.34 As with federal or state legislation proposals, these responsibilities
would aim at addressing problems of disclosure, protecting decision autonomy, or
guaranteeing a set of minimum benefits.
Unfortunately the success of industry self-regulation is questionable35 and
depends on a variety of conditions, such as effective oversight, sanctioning and
other reporting systems. Given that the viators are in a significantly weakened
state due to illness or age it is not clear whether reporting of code violations for
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example would be very likely. However, there exist successful models of industry
self-regulation and it is conceivable that a successful model could be developed for
the viaticals industry as well.
A third option for mitigating negative effects from viaticals is to increase
the autonomy of the involved parties by providing more information about the
product as well as available alternatives. Public information campaigns can
prove effective as vehicles to achieve policy results,36 such as for example around
smoking, family planning, safety, etc. However, it is not clear that the issue of
viaticals would first warrant and elicit the involvement of organizations that could
mount such campaigns, and second overcome obstacles to effectiveness that lie
in message context and interpretation, target group reach, etc.37 Particularly since
the individual circumstances viators find themselves in and the challenges that
each of them face are different, it would be difficult to create a unified and effective message that individuals could respond to. Furthermore, as mentioned
above, individuals considering life settlements are most likely in a weakened state
(mentally and physically) that might reduce their capacity to absorb additional
information.38 While it is conceivable that individuals could see messages about
viaticals before they will be in need of them, it is not likely that this information
will find fertile ground, given that individuals systematically underestimate that
bad things will happen to them and thus discount information associated with
such events.39
In summary, options and opportunities exist to ameliorate the potential
harms associated with viatical settlements. While the success of the options discussed above is questionable, there is nevertheless the possibility to make viaticals, as an economic practice less harmful and subject to abuse than it currently
is. This would mean that the public’s negative moral evaluation of viaticals as
they are currently practiced might change when the economic reality catches up
with moral expectations, at least regarding some moral concerns. It seems, however, that such a change in economic reality is quite unlikely. We argue, even if
such changes could be implemented, other ethical challenges to the practice, we
believe, remain insurmountable. In fact, even the best economic circumstances
do not reduce or eliminate the negative emotional reaction that viaticals are in
essence morbid.
After examining the ethical underpinnings of viaticals in the next section it
should become clear why our negative emotional reaction to viaticals indicates that
something is morally wrong with the practice itself, not with its implementation.
Moreover, this case study also provides evidence that such emotional reactions, in
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general, can be used as moral indicators (signals) that some economic transactions
(ideas) are not just morally suspect given the state of a particular industry, but that
they cross the line between markets and morality (economic value and human
value) and that such economic ideas should not be put in practice in the first place.
In the end, some things should not be for sale, and viaticals is one of them.

Why Viaticals are Morbid
Our moral intuitions manifest themselves in emotional responses to ethically
questionable actions, practices, and institutions. Seeing someone help another
person in need usually causes feeling of hope and joy, or reading about human
trafficking in the newspaper gives rise to emotions such as anger and compassion.
Commonly these emotions are considered blind irrational (or nonrational) bodily
reactions to these situations and, at best, indicate that something might be right or
wrong in a given situation. However, practitioners from psychology to philosophy
have recognized that moral emotions are not irrational bodily movements but, in
fact, have moral evaluative content. For example Cushman et al.40 found that our
moral intuitions express certain moral principles that are subconsciously active
and Heidt41 argued that they reflect societal norms that shape a person’s value
system. Importantly, Martha Nussbaum in her work Upheavals of Thought42 argues that our moral emotions are, in an important sense, cognitive in nature and
always involve moral evaluations. Emotions, for Nussbaum, provide us with moral
knowledge that can be both cognitive and affective. Hence, moral emotions play a
critical role in our moral appraisals and should be leverage when assessing ethical
challenges. Given this, unpacking our negative emotional responses to viaticals is
vital to assessing its ethical viability.
As we discussed in the last two sections, the main line of discussion about the
ethical viability of viaticals has tended to focus on the “reality” or implementation
of viaticals. The argument goes, that if we can just fix the problems of information
asymmetry, decision autonomy, and common abuses through regulations that our
negative emotional reactions to viaticals will be assuaged. As a previous examination of viaticals argues,43 the negative emotional responses to this practice are the
result of the frequent abuses that industry outsiders perceive without recognizing
the benefits that industry insiders see in the practice. In other words, our emotional
responses are the result of an information deficit; thus indicating that there is room
to improve the practice. But after a closer examination of the main theoretical
arguments behind viaticals, we will see that just fixing the “reality” of the practice
papers over the morbidity of the practice itself.
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The two strongest, and most popular, theoretical arguments for viaticals, we
believe, are based on the viator’s property right to sell his or her policy, and the
right of the viator to live out his or her life in dignity, and that viaticals are one
way to exercise that right. Let’s examine property rights first. As we saw earlier,
the legal grounding of viaticals is based on the idea that life insurance policies are
considered property and fall under the purview of property rights. The traditional
rights associated with ownership “include the claim-rights to possess, use, manage, and receive income; the powers to transfer, waive, exclude, and abandon; the
liberties to consume or destroy; immunity from expropriation; the duty not to use
harmfully; and liability for execution to satisfy a court judgment.”44 Thus, from
a property rights perspective, an insured person should be able to change a beneficiary or sell the policy even to someone who might not have an interest in the
insured’s continued life and well-being,45 particularly if the insured is terminally
ill and would need the funds to ease the financial burden of the illness.46
However, not everything is up for sale such as second kidneys, people, and
illegal or prescription drugs. Viaticals, we argue, should be placed in the same
category. Of course a person has a right to buy life insurance to protect one’s family against the insured’s early death. The insurer, in this transaction, is explicitly
interested in the insured’s survival. But if a terminally ill person tries to sell his
or her insurance policy as a viatical, the moral value of the property changes
because the buyer is betting on the viator’s death. The important change that
takes place when a life insurance policy is sold is the removal of the so-called
“insurable interest” from the relationship between the beneficiary of the policy
and the insured person. Insurable interest can be defined as a substantial interest
grounded either in “love and affection” or an economic interest in the continued
life and well-being of the insured.47 Insurable interest is legally required in order
to purchase a life insurance policy in the first place. Without it, people could
potentially take out life insurance policies on anybody they wanted, opening the
door to nefarious activities, such as purchasing policies on terminally ill people.
In fact, in eighteenth century England it was a “sport” to take out speculative life
insurance on public persons, without their knowledge or consent, once it became
known that they were seriously ill. Speculators were basically betting on how
long someone would live and “the premiums on new policies on such persons
fluctuated from day to day in accordance with the reports or rumors on their
condition.”48 To stop this practice parliament enacted a law in 1774 that required
purchasers to have an insurable interest in those they wanted to insure.49 Viaticals
essentially remove the insurable interest, leaving only the investor’s economic
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interest in the quick death of the viator. Thus, viaticals changes the moral value
of the property.
This shift from betting on one’s survival to betting on one’s death substantially
changes not only the moral value of the property, but more importantly, the moral
dynamic between the buyer and seller in such a way that is morally harmful to
both parties. This objection is not new. It has an interesting history that illustrates
the ethical problems with viaticals. An earlier, and one could argue cruder, form
of viaticals can be seen in nineteenth century England. If people could not pay
the premiums on their insurance policies they could sell them at public auctions
at which time speculators could publicly examine the insured persons—a practice
that Elizur Wright, an abolitionist who was visiting England at the time, compared
to slave auctions.50 Though viatical investors today do not publically examine potential viators, they nevertheless do a thorough medical history on the seller.
In modern times, Sandel51 describes a case from the The New York Times
where an investor grows increasing upset that he is not harvesting a profit from
his viaticals investment because his viator, Kendall Morrison, who was dying of
AIDS, did not die, but was returning to health after receiving new drugs. During this time the investor, and presumably the agents working on his behalf, kept
calling and sending FedExes to see if Morrison was still alive.52 While this might
appear to be an extreme case, it is nevertheless a logistical challenge for investors
to determine when the insured has died so the investment can be harvested. Viatical firms take various approaches to “tracking” their investments. For example,
some give a stack of cards to the insured that he or she has to mail monthly and
when a card does not arrive on schedule the “incident” is investigated. Yet others
pay $250 to family members to notify the firm when the insured dies (a practice
that some have compared to paying a bounty hunter).53 These examples might be
either dismissed as sins of the past or borderline cases, but they clearly show that
viaticals can undermine a person’s moral sense of respect and compassion for
other people, essentially treating them as a commodity.
The seller is not immune from this change in moral sensibilities either. In
1997, an article in The Advocate54 describes how AIDS patients attempted to
lower their T cell counts to get a bigger viatical pay outs. It describes how one
potential viator, in order to have a bad medical profile, stopped taking his protease
inhibitors. But as Scott Page, a president of a viaticals company at the time, points
out “if you stop taking the drugs then you can build a resistance, and when you
start again there are not as effective. It’s Russian roulette with an AIDS bullet.”
The potential viator in this case is willing to die sooner in order to get larger settle-
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ment. In other words, viaticals can cause the terminally ill person to views his or
her life as a commodity that can be bought and sold, not as a unique life that has
intrinsic moral worth. Therefore, viaticals create morally perverse incentives that
undercut the value and dignity of human life. Moreover, it cuts away at the moral
ties that bind a just society together, namely the principles of mutual dignity and
respect, and the virtues, such as compassion, that follow from them. We believe
that this is, at bottom, what our negative moral emotional response of morbidity
is expressing.
This objection can also be leverage against the claim that viaticals are necessary to help terminally ill people to live out their lives with dignity. It is true
that some terminally ill people are under enormous financial pressure to keep
up with escalating medical costs and living expenses, and that viaticals industry
can help relieve this pressure. However, we believe that they should not be put in
this dire position in the first place, where, in many cases, they have no choice but
to sell their policies. There are better ways to deal with this issue that does not
have the negative consequences of corroding the moral sensibilities of the buyer
and seller, and also undermines the basic moral principles that hold a just society
together. For example , insurance companies could expand accelerated benefits
where the death benefit is paid out to an insured person with confirmed low life
expectancy (for example less than 6 months) or they could adjust the cash value of
a life insurance policy that an insured can obtain when surrendering their policy
to the insurance company based on the insured’s health.55 Alternatively, on a much
broader level, one could advocate for universal health care, which would presumably lower the chances that ill persons might face severe financial stress due to
medical treatment.
Furthermore, by putting a terminally ill person in a seemingly impossible
position of having to sell his policy to make ends meet also undercuts his duty (or
obligation) of care to the original beneficiaries of the policy. Life insurance was
originally designed to offer financial support for the family of a deceased to help
them adjust to the loss of a source of income and new life circumstances. In taking
out an insurance policy, the policy holder makes at least an implicit promise to
the beneficiaries that they will be supported in case of the policy holder’s death.
Over the generally long duration of such a policy beneficiaries make life choices
that can take this promise into account. For example, the wife of a policyholder
might forgo building a career knowing that a life insurance would offer sufficient
support for a chosen way of life in case of the death of the primary breadwinner.
So the option of selling a policy undermines the policyholder’s responsibilities
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to his beneficiaries and also the beneficiaries’ expectations that the policy will be
there when needed. In some circumstances the “beneficiary may feel pressured to
approve the sale [of the life insurance policy] because opposition to the insured’s
wishes would appear to be based on the beneficiary’s financial interest in retention of the policy.”56 In other circumstances the insured might even sell the policy
without the knowledge of the beneficiary who might still rely on it.57
Proponents of viaticals could argue that these objections go too far and can
be used against other industries as well. If viaticals are inherently unethical because they profit from sickness and death, then so are doctors and funeral directors who also profit from sickness and death. Essentially, viaticals, they argue,
are in the same moral category as doctors and funeral directors. In response, we
argue that of course doctors and funeral directors profit from sickness and death,
but they, unlike the viaticals industry, are working from the moral standpoint
of either making sick people better or helping families deal with the loss of a
loved one. In essence doctors and funeral directors are not investing in the early
demise of terminally ill people, but helping people manage the inevitabilities of
life. However, in the case of viaticals, death becomes an impersonal economic
event for viatical providers because death initiates the payout of an investment.
This event should, from the perspective of the investor, occur as soon as possible
because the timing determines the level of return for the investment. There is
usually no interaction with the decedents or their grief. Funeral directors also
can be said to experience death as the starting point for an economic transaction,
but they mainly focus their efforts on providing families with a service in their
time of grief. In fact, this focus is a central element in the self-conception of this
profession and is expressed throughout the code of professional conduct.58 This
is why we have negative emotional responses to viaticals and not to doctors or
funeral directors.
Another way to get at the morbidity of viaticals is to construct a “perfect
case” scenario of a viatical transaction and see if the arguments we presented
above still hold. Imagine a terminally ill person, without family or beneficiaries,
no medical bills, financially stable, lives in a state that has good regulations, and
well informed about the nature of viaticals. This person wants to sell his policy
so that he can live the last days of his life on a tropical island in the South Pacific.
This may alleviate the problems with the realities of the viatical market, but not
its moral problems. This scenario does not shake off the problem of undermining
the moral sensibilities of the buyer and seller. Again, viaticals, at their core, turn
human life into a commodity, thereby undercutting the natural respect and dignity
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of persons. As we mentioned above, with no insurable interest, the structure of the
transaction encourages the viatical investor to see the viator as a commodity, and
essentially turns what was originally a bet on life into a bet on death.

Conclusion
In this paper we have presented an analysis of the ethical issues surrounding viatical settlements. By distinguishing the ethical challenges that relate to the way
viaticals are bought and sold from ethical challenges that relate to the idea of
viaticals we have tried to show that viaticals are unethical. They are unethical
not because solutions to practical ethical challenges remain elusive but because
certain human experiences should be shielded from economic interference.
Anderson59 in her work Value and Ethics in Economics, and Sandel60 in What
Money Can’t Buy address the problem of mixing economic and non-economic
spheres in various areas of our lives. Both argue that the injection of economics
into practices that are emotional, sacred, and deserving of dignity assumes that
these values can be traded off with economic benefits, but they believe that some
values are incommensurable with economics.61 In the case of viaticals, our negative moral responses are telling us something important about the tension between
the economic and non-economic spheres of life. Viaticals make death not only
an economic transaction for those left behind (during arrangement of funerals,
administration of wills, etc.) but also beforehand for the individual who is going
to die.
Viaticals industry insiders have tried to separate the personal sphere from
the economic sphere in an effort to perhaps increase legitimacy of viaticals by
invoking the progress that a rational perspective on death and dying provides for
society. They have also pointed out that economic transactions occur in the context
of illness and death all the time because undertakers and doctors also make a living
because people get sick and die. However, the emotional reaction people tend to
have when evaluating viaticals are usually absent when evaluating medical and
funeral services, which is an indication that the way the economic sphere touches
the personal sphere in viatical transactions is fundamentally different from the
way other death and illness-related services do. Thus our moral emotions and intuition can be used to show that the boundaries of moral discourse need to be pushed
toward a clearer distinction between theory and practice. They also demonstrate
the importance of moving beyond utilitarian concerns toward notions of rights,
relationships and values.
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